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Abstract 
As markets deepen and interest elasticities increase it is optimal for emerging markets to 
shift towards an interest rate instrument since continuing monetization of the economy 
implies money demand shocks are large. In an extension of the classic instrument choice 
problem to the case of frequent supply shocks, it is shown the variance of output is lower 
with the interest rate rather than a monetary aggregate as instrument, if the interest 
elasticity of aggregate demand is negative, and the interest elasticity of money demand is 
high or low. It is necessary to design an appropriate monetary policy response to supply 
shocks. An evaluation of India’s monetary policy procedures and of the recent fine-
tuning of the liquidity adjustment facility finds them to be in tune with these first 
principles and in the direction of international best practices. But a survey of country 
experiences and procedures, and some aspects of the Indian context suggest further 
improvements. 
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1. Introduction 
Operating procedures are the variety of rules, traditions and practices used in the actual 
implementation of monetary policy. Rules as well as the context and history of actual 
practices are important, so that there are similarities, but also wide divergences in actual 
practices around the world. 
 
Although the final objectives of monetary policy may be low inflation, high growth and 
financial stability, the instruments a central bank has available most closely impact short 
run money market rates or reserve aggregates. These are known as operating objectives. 
The instruments are used in response to information contained in a variety of 
intermediate targets or indicator variables.   
 
Operating procedures affect the equilibration of the demand and supply of reserves or 
deposits held with the Central Bank (CB) against demand deposits of commercial banks. 
 
These deposits are a liability in the CB’s balance sheet and it is the monopolist supplier 
of the deposits. Reserve requirements and characteristics of interbank settlement systems, 
all instruments of a CB, affect the demand for balances.  This is the market the CB most 
directly influences, over horizons from a day to a month. Other instruments of a CB 
include policy rates, market operations and direct controls.  
 
In this paper, the classic instrument choice problem is extended to supply shocks, which 
are common especially in emerging markets. It is shown that when supply shocks are 
frequent, with a negative interest elasticity of aggregate demand, and a high or low 
interest elasticity of money demand, the variance of output is lower with the interest rate 
rather than a monetary aggregate as instrument. Next, the main trends in monetary policy 
operating procedures in emerging markets, differences from industrial countries, and 
some special features in India are examined. Country experiences and procedures that are 
relevant for India are extracted. These and the underlying optimal criteria are used to 
assess changes in the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) operating procedures.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 starts with criteria for optimal choice of 
operating procedures. Then aspects of current practices are discussed in section 3 for 
emerging markets, in section 4 for industrial countries, while section 5 takes up future 
trends. Section 6 highlights some special features in India which help select international 
practices that could be useful for India in section 7. Section 8 concludes with remarks and 
policy implications 
 
2. Criteria for optimal choice of operating procedures 
Since a CB must set policy before observing current disturbances to goods and money 
markets the choice between a monetary aggregate or an interest rate as the instrument, 
depends on the implications of each for the variance of output. That is, will output 
fluctuations be lower if the monetary variable is held constant and the interest rate 
allowed to vary, or vice versa? 
 
Consider the simplified IS (1) and LM (2) curve equations below:   
 
    tttttt uppErx   111           (1) 
 
ttttt vrxpm  21             (2) 
 
Where x is real output; r is the nominal interest rate; m is money supply; p is the price 
level; and E the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t-1. 
Standard conventions are followed: all constants are set to zero, so the lower-case 
variables in natural logarithms are interpreted as deviations from equilibrium values, and 
all coefficients are non-negative. Zero-mean disturbances to equation (1) and (2) 
respectively, are u and v with variances 
2
u  and 
2
v , and covariance uv  is assumed to 
be zero. The shocks u and v are not only disturbances to spending and money demand but 
also capture effects on such behavior due to any other factors, such as financial or 
external shocks independent of monetary policy actions. 
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Poole (1970) showed that varying interest rates was preferable when the variance of 
money demand was high, the IS curve (the good market equilibrium) was flatter and the 
LM curve (money market equilibrium) steeper graphed in nominal interest rate and real 
output space. The slope of the LM curve is 1/β2 and that of the IS curve is -1/α1. 
Targeting monetary aggregates works better if shocks to aggregate demand are large, and 
it is the IS that is steep and the LM is flat. Friedman (1975, 1990) extended the analysis 
to include supply shocks and various lags. Since supply shocks dominate in an emerging 
market, it is worthwhile to carefully examine their implications for choice of procedure.  
 
With rational expectations, prices in the goods and services market are indeterminate 
under an interest rate instrument, and the real interest rate is uniquely determined 
independent of the money supply (Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Monetary policy is 
neutral. Adding aggregate supply behavior to expand Poole’s IS-LM framework is 
worthwhile if wage or price rigidities make money supply non-neutral. The rigidities then 
provide the nominal anchor making prices determinate and monetary policy affects real 
output. The nominal anchor function of money supply is no longer necessary.  
 
Friedman (1990) introduces a supply function (3) derived from an underlying labour 
market equilibrium with less than perfectly flexible nominal wages, and modified from a 
large existing literature. Equation (3) is the first-order condition of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with labour coefficient , so    11  where  > 0,  > 0,  > 1, 
θ ≥ 0. 
  tttt zwpx            (3) 
Where w is the nominal wage in logarithms; and z is a zero-mean disturbance to 
aggregate supply, with variance 2z . If nominal wages are rigid (w = 0), equating labour 
demand  (4) to labour supply (5) to clear the labour market after a supply shock, requires 
  zp   . 
 
 zwpl d            (4) 
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 pwl s             (5) 
Friedman shows that in response to shocks monetary policy can deliver the market-
clearing real wage either by setting m as: 
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Or changing the nominal interest rate to equal: 
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The money stock responds to all three shocks, whereas the interest rate must only 
accommodate aggregate demand and supply shocks, since it automatically accommodates 
money demand shocks.  
 
But (6) and (7) require knowledge of the shocks. The classic instrument problem arises in 
the absence of such knowledge. Then the CB can fix either m = 0 or r = 0 based on zero 
prior expected shocks. But outcomes will differ from equilibrium values. Since now 
money is not neutral, evaluation of the two instruments requires a policy objective 
function giving the weight on real versus nominal target variables. The two instruments 
can then be evaluated by comparing the variance of the policy objective under each. 
 
For example, if the monetary policy objective is to avoid fluctuations in output by 
stabilizing it around the deterministic value x =  0
1
, the choice between fixing m or fixing 
r depend on the variation of output under each instrument. Friedman (1990) derives these 
as:  
        2
2
22
2
2
12
2
22
12
2
22
22 111
zvu
m
xE 







 




         (8) 
 
   
   
2
2
1
22
12
2
1
2
2
11
1
zu
r
xE 









          (9) 
                                                 
1
 As Friedman points out this implies a loss of welfare since changes in the market clearing equilibrium 
value due to real production shocks are not taken into account. Stabilization should be around x-x
e
 where x
e
 
is the new post shock equilibrium.   
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Where   11211   , and the three disturbances are assumed 
independent for simplicity. The relative values will depend on the parameters and the size 
of the shocks, which are empirical matters. But targeting r shields output from any 
disturbance to money demand, while targeting m exposes output to all three disturbances. 
Moreover, 
 
Lemma: If  
2
1
2           (10) 
Or, 
 
1
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1
2
1 1
2 

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
         (11) 
And the IS curve is negatively sloped, an equivalent supply shock increases output 
variance more under a monetary compared to an interest rate instrument. 
 
Proof: Algebraic manipulation of the two coefficients shows the condition for the 
2
z coefficient of  
m
xE 2 to be greater than the 2z  coefficient of  
r
xE 2 is: 
  
  212
211
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
         (12) 
The condition is automatically satisfied if the RHS of (12) is less than 0, since then the 
positive α1 must exceed the RHS.  If (10) holds the numerator of (12) is positive and the 
denominator of (12) is negative. Alternatively, if (11) holds the numerator of (10) is 
negative and the denominator is positive. So in either case the RHS of (12) is negative. 
So condition (12) holds implying a greater impact of 2z on  
m
xE 2 . 
 
Example: If the income elasticity of money demand, β1 = 1 and the coefficient of labour 
demand   = 2, the conditions (10) and (11) reduce to: 
2
1
2   
Or 
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2
3
2
1
2    
Thus the condition (12) implies simple restrictions on the interest elasticity of aggregate 
demand α1, and the interest elasticity of money demand, β2.  
 
In the presence of large or frequent supply shocks, if the LM curve is flat or not very 
steep interesting rate targeting would result in lower output volatility compared to 
monetary targeting. According to Poole’s result, the interest rate instrument was 
preferable when the LM curve was steep. The Lemma, together with Poole’s result, 
implies when supply shocks occur, interest rate targeting is to be preferred for all slopes 
of the LM curve and for all negatively sloped IS curves. A monetary instrument may do 
better only if aggregate demand shocks are large
2
. 
 
Worldwide, since the 1980s, CBs have increasingly focused on short-term interest rates, 
implying accommodation of the demand for bank reserves. One reason was steady 
financial deepening made money demand unstable. In emerging markets money demand 
shocks are likely to be even higher, because apart from financial innovations following 
the developed world, there is continuous monetization of the economy. These 
considerations tend to support an interest rate objective.  
 
The other conclusion is that monetary policy cannot regard its task as acting only on the 
demand side and neglect supply shocks. It needs to respond to the latter also. These are 
also likely to be larger and more sustained in an emerging market. The modern approach 
stresses inflation targeting on the grounds that if a policy response keeps expected excess 
demand at zero, inflation can be contained at zero output cost. This is the ‘divine 
                                                 
2
 In simulations for emerging markets  with β1 = 1; β2 = 0.02; α1 = 0.04;  = 2;  = 0.5; θ = 2; 10
2 .v  ; 
00202 .u  ; 10
2 .z  ; v = 0.5; u = 0.02; z = 0.08   007602 .xE
m
 and   005287062  e.xE
r
. In advanced 
countries if only the elasticity of labour supply θ is reduced to 0.01 there is no change in results. If changes 
are also made to the shocks reducing the size and variance of supply and money demand shocks and 
increasing those of the aggregate demand shocks, such as: 00102 .v  ; 020
2 .u  ; 0010
2 .z  ; v = 0.02; u = 
0.04; z = 0.02; then targeting money aggregates is more effective as in Poole’s results. The output variances 
then are:   004698332  e.xE
r
;   005650912  e.xE
m
. 
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coincidence’ implying there is no need to give any weight to output in the CB’s objective 
function. But the divine coincidence no longer holds under a supply shock. Moreover, 
after the global financial crisis (GFA) the CB’s objective functions have broadened to 
include financial stability. When money demand shocks are large, an intermediate 
targeting rule based on a monetary aggregate alone does worse than a rule that optimally 
responds to new information. 
 
Beyond the simple example given, the CB should respond based on its best forecast of 
shocks to the economy using indicator variables like longer-term interest and exchange 
rates, commodity and asset prices, money and credit, lagged inflation and growth 
variables.  
 
3. Emerging Markets 
In emerging markets
3
, prior to liberalization, and with a bank dominated financial sector, 
the only two instruments needed to make banks change their loans and deposits were 
reserve requirements and the discount rate for borrowing from the CB. Other quantity 
controls were also effective. But as new channels of financial transmission developed, it 
became necessary to affect the behaviour of participants in markets such as money and 
interbank markets.  Bank interest rates then depended on rates in other financial markets, 
as did household behaviour. In addition to firms’ loan, demand from households was also 
more sensitive to interest rates. So interest rates began playing a greater role in the 
transmission of monetary policy. The increasing importance of the price mechanism 
meant focusing on quantities could make short-term interest rates volatile, reducing 
policy impact on intermediate targets.  
 
So in the market for bank reserves CB objectives began to be increasingly defined in 
terms of short-term interest rates. The maturity of the targeted rates also shrank, since 
better-articulated financial markets transmitted policy impulses down the yield curve, as 
well as provided valuable information on market expectations to CBs.  
                                                 
3
 Features of, and comparison between emerging and industrial countries, are largely based on Borio (1997) 
and Van’t dack (1999). 
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While short-term interest rates serve to signal the policy stance, careful liquidity 
management is required to support the short-rates. This is attempted more through market 
operations with an emphasis on flexible repo transactions. Standing facilities are also 
important. The advantages of the repo are they can be done even without liquid 
underlying security markets; impact on security prices is limited and indirect; the 
maturity of the paper and the transaction can differ; temporary reserve adjustment can be 
done in a single transaction as compared to two outright operations. Standing facilities 
are also organized through repos. 
 
There is more awareness of market psychology and the advantages of transparency in 
forming market expectations, since CBs can now achieve their objectives only through 
the markets. Innovations such as RTGS are pushing the CB to even shorter horizons, so 
there is a concern also with provision of intraday liquidity. 
 
4. Industrial countries 
Similar trends are more advanced in industrial countries. Reserve requirements usually 
hold on average over a period, and therefore provide a valuable buffer for banks. But they 
have fallen to reduce the implicit tax on banks, since competition has increased from 
other financial assets, and substitution occurs away from facilities that attract reserve 
requirements. The demand for bank reserves now comes largely from settlement 
balances, which are highly interest insensitive. Therefore variations in liquidity can lead 
to large fluctuations in interest rates. The demand for settlement balances depends on 
characteristics of the settlement system such as penal rates or conditions of late day CB 
assistance. 
 
With the decline of the reserve buffer, liquidity management or forecasting has become 
an important part of equating the demand and supply of bank reserves for the CB. This is 
distinct from monetary policy signals, which work largely through short-rates. CBs differ 
greatly in the variety of signals employed. These perform a number of testing and 
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exploratory roles, but the variety has been reducing in importance due to the emphasis on 
transparency. 
 
Liquidity management requires distinguishing between the different autonomous sources 
of bank reserves, which change items in a CB’s balance sheet. The major sources of 
autonomous variation are changes in net foreign assets and in net lending to the 
government. The net liquidity position (NLP) is the difference between the amount 
demanded and the autonomous creation of reserves. On an ex ante basis, this is the 
amount that has to be met by the CB. Forecasts of NLP contribute to liquidity 
management. CB’s in industrial countries prefer to adjust marginal liquidity largely 
through discretionary OMOs and repos. Standing facilities, which are available on 
demand to market participants, help meet end-of-day imbalances, set a range for the 
overnight rate, or provide subsidized intramarginal liquidity. 
 
5. Future trends 
Woodford (2001) argues that it is not correct that the ability of the CB to influence 
markets will decrease as they become more efficient, that is uncertainties about clearing 
accounts at the time of trading fall and information flows become so fast that the demand 
for settlement balances falls and becomes less interest elastic, and they become a small 
fraction of total transactions. Payments will continue to be settled using CB accounts 
because of network externalities and the natural advantages of the CB in running a 
payments system. 
 
5.1 Standing facilities 
CBs can continue to set overnight interest rates in a tight range through the use of 
standing facilities with the target rate between a deposit and (collateralized) lending rate. 
There is a small penalty to using the lending facility since the rate charged is above the 
overnight rate, but there is no rationing or implicit penalties such as are often associated 
with discount facilities. No bank would want to pay another bank a rate higher than at 
which it can borrow from the CB; no bank would be willing to lend overnight cash at a 
rate lower than what it can get from the CB; the spread between the rates gives banks an 
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incentive to trade with one another, as long as the overnight rate does not reach one or the 
other bound.     
 
Accurate liquidity forecasting and supply of aggregate clearing balances is required to 
keep the overnight rate within the range, and reduce its fluctuations. But the supply is 
adjusted to match autonomous variation, not to signal or implement changes in the target 
rate, as happens in countries that do not use a LAF corridor. 
 
Interest rates can be raised even if a higher opportunity cost makes banks economize on 
settlement balances, since what is important is the range between the lending and the 
borrowing rates and not the level of rates. If the target interest rate were to be raised, the 
deposit rate would also be raised. The demand for clearing balances is independent of the 
absolute level of interest rates but is a function of the location of the overnight rate 
relative to the boundaries of the corridor. It follows that adjustment of rates need not 
require quantity adjustment or change in the supply of clearing balances, just 
announcement of the new target rate with suitable adjustment of the band. Quantity 
targeting would be ineffective under inelastic demand for settlement balances, but elastic 
demand would only require more OMOs to match the changes in demand
4
. In countries 
where the CB keeps the target rate near the center of the band, a convention develops to 
trade at that level, since it implies an equal division of the gains from trade, and saves 
costly auctioning. Then volatility of the target rate falls and it stays perfectly at the 
center, as for example, in Malaysia. 
     
The width of the channel should be sufficient to ensure an interbank market exists. Under 
improved forecastability of end-of-day positions this becomes less of a concern, and the 
channel size can shrink. A smaller channel size also increases the interest sensitivity of 
demand for settlement balances. In equilibrium a constant range between the overnight 
rate and the deposit rate implies a constant tax on holding balances with the CB. A 
                                                 
4
 Friedman and Kuttner ( 2011) argue CB signaling on future interest can shift bank’s demand for reserves, 
making it inelastic in the longer-run. This implies the CB can expand or contract its balance sheet, changing 
the supply of reserves, without affecting its policy rate.  In effect the link between the quantity of reserves 
and the policy rate is broken.   
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constant tax has efficiency properties. Thus there is no conflict between increasing 
microeconomic efficiency yet ensuring macroeconomic stability.     
 
CBs in emerging markets (EMs) continue to use reserve requirements to offset 
autonomous variations in liquidity as well as to control monetary policy. But reducing 
reserve requirements is a long-term aim of reform to make banks competitive as markets 
develop, and to prevent arbitrage to sections that escape such requirements.     
 
5.2 Financial stability 
A major new trend after the global financial crisis is the greater concern of CBs 
worldwide with financial stability. Although reserve requirements had been falling in 
order to reduce transaction costs and taxes in markets, the crisis has led to the realization 
that countercyclical liquidity buffers have an important role in countering the tendency 
towards procyclical balance sheet expansion in the financial sector
5
. This may reverse the 
tendency towards falling liquidity ratios. Since such ratios affect the competitiveness of 
the financial sector, their imposition is best done as part of a global agreement on 
financial reform. Capital buffers are an important part of reforms such as BASEL III. 
 
Palley (2000) had a suggestion for Asset Based Reserve Requirements (ABRR), where 
banks have to hold differential reserves based on asset classes. Can be designed to give 
countercyclical benefits. While cash (capital) reserve requirements operates on the 
liabilities side, ABRRs operate on the asset side, and could complement risk based capital 
adequacy weights. They also provide seignorage benefits, which have been shrinking 
with the reduction in reserve requirements (Nachane, 2010). 
 
6. India: Similarities and differences 
Apart from sharing emerging market characteristics, India has some special features. Its 
large oil imports, continued monsoon dependence of agriculture, changes in the 
                                                 
5
 Adrian and Shin (2008) show that contractions in balance sheet growth have tended to precede declines in 
real economic growth. Funding conditions are closely ties to this leverage of market-based financial 
intermediaries. Banking and capital market developments become inseparable in a market-based financial 
system.  
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production structure during a catch-up high growth phase, imply it is subject to repeated 
supply shocks. Ongoing labour absorption in the modern sector increases output response 
and makes the IS relatively flat. Demand shocks are not so frequent since the ratios of C, 
I and G to output are relatively stable. Steady financial development has increased the 
importance of interest rates in monetary transmission, even though the process is not 
complete. Thin markets led to many monetary and asset price shocks. The causal chain 
from the monetary base to broad money is more erratic. All these considerations suggest 
the CB should move towards targeting short-term interest rates rather than the monetary 
base.  
 
The RBI shifted from monetary targets to a multiple indicator approach in the late 
nineties. Interest rates were gradually given greater importance. A LAF evolved from the 
discount rate and liquidity absorption facilities after 2000. Although it is not a pure 
standby facility, fluctuations in the overnight call money rate have reduced since then. 
Fixed rate auctions were reintroduced to support interest rate signals to the markets.       
 
Since public sector banks tend to have large stocks of government securities they have 
greater ability to borrow in collateralized markets and lend to others at higher 
uncollateralized rates. So during periods of tight liquidity market rates would exceed the 
LAF repo. In the CLBO mutual funds tend to be on one side, and there are problems of 
timing. The interbank market has not developed adequately so the call rate tends to be at 
the repo or reverse repo rate depending on if the RBI is in net injection or absorption 
mode. Term money markets for longer maturities and for discretionary operations are 
even less developed.  
 
In 2011 the LAF system was further fine tuned following a report of a working group 
(RBI, 2011). The repo rate was chosen as the single policy rate, and the weighted average 
call money market rate as the operating target, in order to remove possible confusion due 
to multiple rates and to better focus markets. A fixed corridor of 200 basis points was set 
with the policy rate in the middle, bounded by a new Marginal Standing Facility (MSF) 
above and the reverse repo rate below. Since monetary transmission was found to be 
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more effective under deficit liquidity conditions, and the aim was to keep liquidity 
towards the upper end of the corridor. Under such conditions, automatic collateralized 
(from the SLR portfolio) loans of up to 1 percent of NDTL from the MSF would buffer 
against unanticipated liquidity shocks, preventing the interest rate from overshooting.  
Liquidity shocks in excess of 1 percent of NDTL were to be neutralized through longer 
term instruments such as OMOs, CRR and MSS. 
 
But large autonomous liquidity shocks, due to large and erratic net foreign inflows and 
government balances, together with a paucity of discretionary instruments make liquidity 
balancing difficult. Each country’s context varies and the historical path selected impacts 
the present in various ways. But the experience of other countries can offer valuable 
insights for key policy issues and decisions. 
 
7. Useful country practices 
7.1 Autonomous variation in liquidity: supply of reserves  
How have other countries managed large autonomous variations from Government 
balances and foreign inflows? 
 
Uneven revenue and spending profiles generate lumpy transfers of public funds to and 
from the CB, which disturb the level of bank reserves. This is the largest source of 
variation in most countries, since the CB is the banker to the Government. In many 
countries these transfers follow a pre-specified schedule; large transfers require formal 
notice; joint committees forecast government budget transactions; arrangements for tax 
collection and spending are designed to smooth changes in the government’s account; 
surplus funds held at the CB are lent to financial institutions; CBs have the discretion to 
shift the Treasury’s deposits to commercial banks; incentives are created for the 
Government by paying lower interest rates on excess balances. Since the Treasury’s 
active management of its funds can interfere with short-term interest rates it is not 
allowed to place funds in the overnight market, but arrangements are put in place to 
invest surplus funds in the market.   
 
 15 
In most EMs limits are imposed on the Government’s recourse to CB credit. Only in a 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, apart from India, is management of the public debt largely 
the CB’s responsibility.  In South Africa, separation of the CB’s function as market 
maker in public debt and its monetary policy function was achieved in 1998 through the 
creation of primary dealers.   
 
Except at times of exchange rate pressure or large inflows, FX intervention is not such a 
large source of variation in autonomous liquidity. Since most markets have a two-day 
settlement lag for FX transactions, these are known with certainty for daily operations. 
But large inflows have been a major reason for continuation of reserve requirements in 
EMs since they sterilize the impact of inflows on reserve balances. Reserve requirements 
are a way to make banks share the fiscal cost sterilization imposes. But, over time, they 
lead to a substitution away to channels not subject to reserve requirements. A sharp 
reduction in reserve requirements can also lead to a spurt in credit, which was implicated 
in the Mexican Peso crisis of 1994.  
 
The buffer function of reserve requirements and active liquidity management are the 
main ways variability in the net supply of liquidity due to these autonomous sources can 
be reduced.  
 
7.2 Reserve requirements: Demand for reserves 
EMs continue to impose reserve requirements, and although averaging is allowed, the 
period of maintenance is 2 weeks compared to one month in industrial countries, 
reflecting their use in monetary control in EMs rather than in liquidity management. 
Averaging allows banks to use reserves to offset temporary liquidity shortages during the 
maintenance period. In countries that follow a policy more oriented towards quantitative 
controls, reserve accounting and maintenance is contemporaneous. With lags, the 
requirement becomes known early in the maintenance period, reducing uncertainty about 
the level of settlement balances. In India it is lagged two weeks. 
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The figure shows the rise in cash balances held with the RBI over 2007-08, with a rise in 
the CRR, and their systematic fluctuations over the maintenance period. Sharp peaks 
coincide with the reporting period.  
Despite the compulsory reserves and averaging, demand for reserves is inelastic since 
banks fear not being able to meet the requirement later in the maintenance period or fear 
penal interest rates. The conditions under which they can obtain CB credit on demand are 
important.  
 
 So CBs have a trade off. If they do not allow reserves averaging and lags they need to 
fine-tune the supply of liquidity. If liquidity forecasting is poor, it is better to allow more 
averaging. Errors in liquidity forecasting will lead to sharp fluctuations in interest rates if 
interest elasticity of demand for reserves is low, because of the absence of adequate 
averaging. The introduction of RTGS has led to provision of intraday credit, which 
avoids excessive reliance on penal end-of-day facilities. EMs also rely more on standing 
facilities.   
 
CBs informally contact banks to estimate settlement balance needs. Although most CBs 
do not make their estimates public, since they are subject to large errors, some do, since it 
facilitates banks’ liquidity management. 
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7.3 Liquidity management: Discretionary operations 
Industrial countries have shifted towards liquidity activism as reserve requirements have 
fallen. In EMs discretionary operations are limited by a shortage of underlying securities 
and inadequate depth of markets. The dominant instrument is domestic repos, followed 
by foreign exchange swaps. Short-term paper and secondary market transactions are also 
used, but direct intervention in money markets is rare. Interventions are based on 
liquidity forecasts ranging between one day and two months. 
 
Countries specify the underlying assets to be used as collateral for the repo, generally 
fixed rate Government or quasi-government paper. Some countries have widened the 
range of eligible paper to get over the problem of lack of eligible collateral in the market. 
The range of counterparties and maturities used are also wide. In Korea merchant banks, 
securities, investment and trust companies as well as banks are eligible counterparties and 
maturities extend upto 91 days. In 1997 as credit risk increased Korean banks became 
reluctant to deal with other financial institutions, so the volatility of call rates increased 
greatly. The CB decided to include these institutions in its liquidity providing and 
absorbing functions. 
 
Like domestic repos, FX swaps affect liquidity without impacting the spot rate and are 
used where FX markets are liquid or in order to develop them. Valuation changes, 
however, expose CBs to risk. If intervention to support the currency fails unwinding the 
forward leg of the swap will impose large losses. 
 
Outright transactions are constrained by the lack of depth of government securities 
markets, fear of adversely affecting their price, and since a large proportion of such 
securities may be locked up in liquidity requirements mandated for banks.    
 
CBs also issue their own paper to induce a net deficit in liquidity to add to desirable 
collateral, or to create a liquid benchmark yield curve. The Bundesbank has used 
“liquidity paper” with a maturity of between one and three days, the Netherlands Bank 
has issued six months certificates, UK has weekly Treasury bill tenders, and the Bank of 
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Japan tenders its own bills, of maturity between one and five days. EMs that auction CB 
paper include Brazil, Korea, Peru, Thailand and Poland. In Israel the Treasury agreed to 
issue short-term notes for monetary policy purposes, not for financing the budget. 
      
One or two instruments, which the market has learnt to monitor, may be used in order to 
send clear signals; instruments used may be varied according to the requirements of the 
situation. Each CB normally has one keynote operation, with short maturities, that in 
addition to satisfying the basic liquidity needs, signals its intentions to the market. Often 
the keynote function can only inject liquidity so that excessive liquidity has to be mopped 
up to induce a net liquidity shortage.  
 
7.4. Liquidity management: Standing facilities 
These have evolved from the merging of various sectoral discount facilities with penal or 
subsidized deviations from the bank rate, to a general rate at which the CB injects 
liquidity. Liquidity absorption sets the floor rate. A true standing facility is used at the 
discretion of market participants, but some CBs impose various kinds of restrictions on 
quantity and timing so it functions rather as an interest rate corridor or liquidity 
adjustment facility. By calibrating the need for late day assistance from the CB or the 
need to deposit surplus funds, the CB can put pressure on interest rates as required, and 
get an estimate of liquidity pressures in the market.  
 
Since liquidity injection is at above market rates in a standing facility, subsidized 
discount facilities have lost significance in liquidity management. The interest rate 
corridor can be widened to accommodate greater volatility due to interest rate pressures, 
or as Israel did, convert the discount window mechanism into a ladder of windows, each 
carrying a higher rate. For both industrial and EMs the standing facility serves as a 
“safety valve”—for the first because of low reserve buffers; for EMs, because of large 
autonomous variation in liquidity and poor forecasting. As Woodford (2001) notes, for a 
standing facility to work well to set the policy rate, good forecasting and market-based 
supply of liquidity, and a well functioning interbank market are prerequisites.   
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CBs through moral suasion and ensuring sufficient funds are available in the system, so 
banks do not need to borrow from the CB, help the development of an active interbank 
market, thus reducing need for CB intervention. Settlement procedures are designed to 
allow banks to borrow and lend in the interbank market towards the end of the day after 
third parties have exited and settlement positions are known. 
 
7.5. Price or quantity operating objective 
Financial deepening has eroded the usefulness of a monetary aggregate as an intermediate 
target in industrial countries. Market development and internationalization has increased 
the role of interest rates in policy transmission, made markets more vulnerable to sharp 
movements in rates, and increased the influence of expectations on interest and exchange 
rates. 
 
Many EMs continue to use monetary targets, but in an indicative way, and supplemented 
with rate variables. A monetary target may be regarded as useful to constrain government 
spending or prevent asset bubbles in narrow financial markets. Or interest rates may be 
regarded as noisy indicators of the policy stance due to higher volatility and higher 
inflation.  
 
In most industrial and several emerging economies the overnight rate is the operating 
target since that is the rate most directly under the CB’s influence. But which rate 
depends on the characteristics of the financial market and monetary transmission. Since 
commercial bank rates are based on longer-term money market rates, the Bank of 
England’s operating targets are one to three month rates. In emerging markets, if 
overnight rates are volatile or market segmentation prevents their smooth transmission 
CBs may be reluctant to make overnight rates their operating targets. The latter may 
depend on the maturity chosen for keynote operations. 
 
Lower volatility in the operating target helps transmit policy signals and develop markets, 
but too little volatility may cloud market signals. Precise liquidity projections are 
required for more interest rate smoothing. 
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7.6. Signaling 
It is now widely agreed that the economic environment is not stationary so there cannot 
be a unique rational expectations equilibrium. If the CB just does what markets expect it 
can lead to a self-fulfilling equilibrium far from fundamentals in some circumstances 
(Woodford, 2003). The CB has a role in guiding markets. Conventional wisdom for CBs 
has changed from saying as little as possible to the importance and the art of managing 
market expectations.  
 
Communication makes monetary policy more effective either by creating news, or by 
reducing noise (Blinder et. al. 2008). If market participants understand how the CB 
implements its policy, they may anticipate policy and help the CB achieve its objectives. 
For example, greater transparency could make the demand for reserves more interest 
elastic helping the CB control the overnight rate. CBs try to make clear the distinction 
between technical operations to manage liquidity and actions to change policy. They say 
as little as possible on non-keynote operations to focus markets on relevant actions.  
 
The policy signal is conveyed through announcements of operating targets or through 
keynote fixed rate tender operations. In tenders with a pre-announced volume of paper, 
interest rates are determined in the market. Fixed rate tenders send a strong rate signal to 
markets. Most repos are through fixed rate tenders. It is always possible for the CB to 
adjust the rate in frequent tenders depending on market feedback and volume demanded. 
Since tenders are now more frequent and with lower average maturity market forces can 
exert greater influence. Standing facilities are also used to signal rates. 
 
Blinder et. al (2001) point out that as CBs become more transparent and credible, markets 
and individuals become more forward looking. Ultimately the effect of the interest rate 
on inflation has to work through the yield curve and the wage-price setting mechanism. 
To the extent the Phillips curve is backward looking, transmission takes long as frictions 
work through the system. With a forward-looking Phillips curve, interest rate changes 
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quickly anchor inflation expectations, wages are not raised and transmission lags to 
inflation are reduced.    
 
While there is agreement on transparency of objectives and on general procedures, less 
clarity on specific aspects gives CBs some discretion to respond to circumstances and 
gives markets some leeway in affecting outcomes. So CBs always have some freedom 
and flexibility. Surprising markets sometimes can be good for markets. 
 
8. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
As markets deepen and interest elasticities increase it is optimal for emerging markets to 
shift towards an interest rate instrument. Ironically, the argument of dualism and 
segmentation, which is used to argue that interest rates are not effective in emerging 
markets actually supports interest rate targeting after a minimal threshold of market 
development. The reason is continuing monetization of the economy implies money 
demand shocks are large. And interest rate targeting is more effective when money 
demand shocks dominate. But dualism means supply shocks are also more frequent in 
EMs. And it is necessary to design an appropriate monetary policy response to them.  
 
The working of India’s LAF and its recent fine tuning is in the direction of international 
best practices, and in tune with first principles. The first few months of operation with the 
revised LAF shows a reduction in the standard deviation of short-term interest rates 
(Mohanty, 2011).  
 
The signaling of the monetary policy stance has improved with the repo as the single 
policy rate. The MSF rate at the upper end and the reverse repo at the lower end will 
change automatically with the repo to maintain a fixed corridor. With the focus on a rate, 
the RBI will be free to shift liquidity in the opposite direction, without confusing the 
market
6
.  
                                                 
6
 In 2010 as Government cash balances grew steeply because of a 3G auction windfall liquidity tightened 
and banks had to borrow upwards of the RBI’s comfort level of 1 percent of NDTL from the markets. The 
RBI would have liked to increase primary liquidity, but was afraid that markets would misinterpret a rise in 
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The weighted average call money rate has been identified as the single operating target 
since it most directly reflects pressures in the money market thus transmitting the 
monetary policy stance. A keynote operation, such as CBs also use to focus expectations 
has, however, not yet been identified. Worldwide repo instruments are preferred. That 
they do not impact government securities (Gsecs) prices much is a particularly useful 
property in thin markets. Keynote operations of a suitable maturity may be developed, to 
help manage expectations. The RBI may consider developing a market in its own paper, 
or special government paper reserved for monetary policy purposes. 
 
In an EM, however, problems remain on both the supply and the demand side of reserve 
balances. On the supply side large autonomous shocks to liquidity, and the paucity of 
discretionary instruments to adjust for it, create problems. The MSF will provide some 
buffer against unanticipated liquidity shocks. It is available more at the discretion of 
market participants, and the set of paper accepted as collateral has expanded. There is an 
attempt to improve the accuracy of RBI’s liquidity forecasts made available to markets, 
and to expand the set of instruments for longer-term liquidity adjustment. But demand for 
Gsecs in OMOs depends on more regular buying and selling of Gsecs—for term markets 
to develop some portion of SLR holdings should be marked to market so the held to 
maturity portion decreases. 
 
In the future, penalties such as are imposed on Government balances in various countries 
could be considered. This would have the desirable consequence of improving discipline 
in the planning and use of government cash balances, thus saving taxpayers’ money. 
Reducing interest rates on extra balances as is done in some countries is not an option 
since the RBI does not pay interest on these balances. There is a suggestion for auction of 
government cash balances (Mohanty, 2011). In some countries excess government 
deposits are placed in other commercial banks. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
liquidity at a time it was raising interest rates as part of a tightening cycle. When the rate clearly reflects the 
policy stance quantity adjustments can be in the opposite direction.  
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The demand for reserve balances depends on the settlement systems, the cost of 
borrowing from the CB, the depth of the inter-bank market, and legal requirements such 
as maintenance periods etc. To the extent the interbank market becomes vibrant the rates 
will stay in the interior of the corridor rather than depend on the RBI at the margins in 
injection or absorption mode. As markets become more efficient, a norm is established, 
and volatility decreases, the market rate will stay closer to the center of the LAF corridor, 
and the corridor itself can shrink. The only current step towards these aims is the 
extension of timing for T+0 short-term money market segments transactions to match 
RTGS reducing uncertainty on banks CRR positions. Provided more instruments become 
available to adjust longer-term liquidity, the maintenance period for reserve requirements 
could be increased to one month, with a suitable lag between the calculation period and 
maintenance period. In Indian conditions since public, private and foreign banks have 
different borrowing needs, overlapping maintenance periods may help develop a more 
active interbank market. The sharp fluctuations in Figure 1 would reduce, although the 
average levels of balances may be similar. 
 
To the extent reserve requirements will have to continue given large foreign inflows they 
could be better used to improve incentives and stability of the financial sector by 
converting CRR partially into ABRR.   
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